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Abstract
Economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on
incentive-based regulation such as price caps. We focus on the effect of regulation as
distinct from ownership, and identify the effect of two different regulatory schemes on
both publicly and privately owned Spanish electricity generators.  Publicly owned
generators were more efficient under cost of service regulation; private (but not
public) firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency, bringing their
productivity to similar levels.  We introduce some novelty in modelling efficiency,
including three pollutants and declared plant availability as outputs, and we test for the
effect of environmental regulation in reducing pollutants.
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1. Introduction
Economic regulation of firms with market power has undergone major reform in the
past twenty years. The emphasis has shifted away from cost-plus regulation, where
prices reflected the level of costs which firms had incurred, towards incentive based
regulation systems such as price cap, sliding scale regulation, and yardstick
competition. Such incentive regulation is in its early days in the US, particularly in the
telecoms and energy industries, where it is being introduced to remedy high costs and
inefficient input choice resulting from many years of cost-plus regulation. Price cap is
one form of regulation with high-powered incentives: prices or revenues are capped so
that the company can increase profits only by reducing its costs. Change from a cost of
service system of regulation to a price cap incentive would therefore be expected to
induce increased efficiency (Liston, 1993). However we would expect the effect to
differ in the private and the public sectors.
In the UK, price cap regulation was introduced simultaneously with the transfer of
firms from the public to the private sector. Much of the argument for this change in
ownership was also on efficiency grounds – that companies would have greater
incentives to reduce costs if they owned the residual profits, rather than having to
return them to the Government as they had when nationalised.  Price caps were seen
primarily as a means of preventing monopoly exploitation, with the additional benefit
of the desirable incentive properties outlined above (Littlechild, 1983).  There have
indeed been substantial cost reductions in UK industries privatised in the eighties and
early nineties (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, show this effect for electricity generation)
but the coincidence of the change of ownership and the new regulatory system
2 makes
it difficult to distinguish the effects of each of these changes.
However at the same time as price caps were being introduced for many newly
privatised British utilities, a similar reform was introduced in the Spanish electricity
sector, with a change from a cost-plus type regulation to an incentive based scheme in
1988; the same reform was applied to firms (continuing) in both public and private
sectors, with no change of ownership until much later, at the end of the period which
we are considering.  We are therefore able to examine the effect of a simultaneous
change from cost-plus to incentive regulation on both private and public firms, in the
context of a stable ownership structure.
We use data on inputs and outputs to calculate the Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
change in the Spanish coal-fired generating plants over the 1984-1997 period. Since
coal-based generation accounted for more than 40% of total electricity production in
Spain during these ten years, the evaluation of the productivity gains in these plants
gives us a valuable insight into how well this system performed. At the same time,
given that the Spanish electricity industry was a mixed system of public and private
ownership, the paper explores differences in behaviour and performance between
public and private generators.
We use mathematical programming methods both to assess the evolution of the
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productive efficiency and to construct the Malmquist productivity index to compute
and decompose the TFP change into the main components of productivity growth,
namely technical efficiency change, differences in scale efficiency and technological
change. This methodology is particularly useful to measure TFP growth in regulated
environments, characterised by unavailability or distortions of cost and price
information.  However we depart from the standard use of inputs and outputs in
assessing productivity in electricity generation, to better reflect the central despatching
system used for generation in Spain and to include pollutants, and compare our results
with the standard model.
The next section explains the background to the regulatory reform and the effect
which we would expect it to have, leading to the formulation of the hypotheses which
we test; section 3 explains the Malmquist indices and the novelty of our model;
section 4 presents our data and main results, and section 5 compares these with
alternative models; section 6 concludes.
2. Background
The Spanish electrical power industry is the fifth largest in the European Union with
43,551 MW of installed capacity and 162,180 MWh demanded in 1997 (REE, 1997).
As Table 1 shows, the structure of generation is diverse, as a result of the endowment
of natural resources and energy policy decisions made at the end of the 70´s.
[Table 1 about here]
Spain has significant hydroelectric resources, which currently represent 38% of total
installed capacity.  However, because of variation in precipitation, there are
substantial differences in hydro production between dry and wet years.  During 1984-
1997 average annual hydro generation accounted for around 20% of total output.
Spain has practically no domestic reserves of petroleum and natural gas, coal being
the only indigenous fossil fuel.  Oil-based generation represented around 40% of the
total production in 1974/76, but after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, policy was to
reduce dependence on external energy sources, leading to a construction programme
of coal-fired and nuclear plants.  Between 1974 and 1985 five nuclear reactors and
twenty-one coal generating units came into operation.  Coal-fired plants, built to
increase consumption of domestic coal, generated 42% of total electricity production
during the 1984-1997 period, while the contribution of oil fell virtually to zero by the
end of the period.
From 1988 to 1998 the Spanish electricity industry was controlled by the "Marco
Legal Estable" (hereafter MLE) or Stable Legal Framework. The MLE came into force
at the beginning of 1988, and constituted a new regulatory régime
3, established by
Royal Decree 1538/1987 of 11 December 1987, representing the culmination of a long
reorganisation process which had started at the beginning of the eighties.  The MLE
replaced a régime based on a non-transparent, negotiated, cost of service regulation:
the Ministry of Industry and Energy had approved tariffs designed to cover the costs
which the firms declared.  This type of regulation, negotiated behind closed doors, led
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to a situation which, years later, was described as  “unbearable obscurity” by the
current Chairman of the CNSE (Fernández-Ordónez, 1996).  It is not surprising that
this régime caused deep concern about the firms’ levels of productive efficiency; a
major objective of the 1988 reform was the introduction of incentive mechanisms to
promote efficiency in the firms.
The MLE established “standard costs”, which constituted the key feature of the
regulatory régime.  Each item required to supply  power was allocated such a standard
cost.  These costs were established separately for generation and distribution,
depending on the characteristics of the installation, and applied to each firm; they
were determined regardless of the costs of any individual firm, and indeed without
reference even to the average costs of the firms.  Firms were allowed revenue based
on these standard costs, irrespective of the actual costs which they incurred.  The
allowed costs were increased by the retail price index each year.  There was no
expected reduction in price as a result of potential efficiency gains, and so the firms
had no temptation to try and manipulate costs to influence future allowed revenue
levels
4.  In this sense it was a purer price cap than that applied to privatised industries
in the UK where caps are reviewed at fixed intervals, and where the revised cap
depends partly on the firms’ own performances during the previous period
5.  In the
Spanish system allowed revenue was determined exogenously: if the firm incurred
lower (greater) costs than the standard costs, it kept (absorbed) the difference.  The
scheme thus exhibited the incentive properties of pure price cap regulation.  Laffont
and Crampes (1995) express doubts about the 'purity' of the cap, mainly on the
grounds that it could distort managers' investment decisions.  Our main focus is on a
short-run model where capital is a fixed input, so this issue does not arise.  However
we also analyse long run efficiency, and discuss the implications of these doubts in the
context of our results.
We would expect the application of an incentive scheme to have very different effects
on private and public companies.  Although there is literature on the relative
efficiency of public and private firms (e.g. Caillaud et al, 1988, Vickers and Yarrow,
1988, Laffont and Tirole, 1993), we do not know of models which predict productive
efficiency under different types of price cap, and so we give an outline here of what
we would expect.  The main difference between private and public sector firms
concerns the objective function of the owners.  In the private sector this is
maximisation (or similar) of profits, while the public sector objective function would
include other factors, in particular a negative weight on any subsidies required.  Our
prior assessment of the effect of different regulatory régimes on productive efficiency
is based primarily on these differences in objectives.
Consider first the effect of the old régime of cost of service regulation, where each
firm is virtually guaranteed reimbursement of its costs.  Profit will not be increased by
reductions in cost, and so the private company has no incentive to cut costs.  If prices
were determined by the cost level of the individual firm, then profits might be
increased by reduced costs through their effect on prices and demand.  But in the case
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we consider, where aggregate prices are set to cover the costs of electricity suppliers
as a whole, and the costs of each generator reimbursed, the relation between costs and
prices for any one firm is too tenuous to be relevant.
Similarly public companies cannot increase profits by reducing costs.  But unlike their
private counterparts, public owners are likely to attach a positive weight to lowering
costs, because this reduces the reimbursement necessary within the cost of service
regulation scheme, and relieves pressure on public funds.  Therefore if the owners are
equally effective at transmitting their objectives to managers, we would expect the
direct interest which the public sector has in minimising the subsidy to be reflected in
lower costs and greater productive efficiency in the public than in the private sector
under cost of service regulation.  This is consistent with de Fraja's (1993) suggestion
that the public sector may be more efficient, and leads to our first hypothesis: that
public companies are more efficient than private companies under cost of service
regulation.
However the move to price cap regulation provides rather different incentives.  Here
firms retain any profit generated by cost reductions.  Any increase in productive
efficiency will increase profit; since prices are fixed by the level of the cap, cost
reductions will not affect demand (assuming that the cap is binding).  Profit is the only
objective of the private firms, so there is a one-to-one relation between cost reductions
and increases in the value of the objective function; in contrast profit maximisation
may be only one of several objectives in the public sector, and so the relation between
increased productivity and the objective function is diluted.  We  therefore expect
price caps to increase efficiency in both sectors, but the effect to be greater, and
quicker, in the private sector.  Adjustment would be quicker amongst private firms not
only because the relation between cost reductions and the objective function of the
owners is more immediate.  Two other factors would magnify this effect.  If they are
already less efficient they would have more ground to recover, and the control
mechanisms for aligning managers’ actions to owners’ objectives may be stronger in
the private than the public sector.  Our second and third hypotheses follow, namely
that productivity will grow more in private firms than in public firms when price cap
regulation is introduced and that the private sector will operate more efficiently under
this regulation system than their public counterparts.
The MLE was itself eventually replaced by further reforms.  In April 1993 the
Government approved a draft bill to introduce some general liberalisation measures in
order to promote a higher degree of transparency and competition within the
electricity market
6.   However the sector continued operating under the MLE until 31
December 1997.  Approval of the new Electricity Law 54/1997, establishing the
liberalisation of the sector from 1998 (see Arocena et al. 1998), replaced the Stable
Legal Framework, and paved the way for privatisation.  We restrict our analysis to the
years immediately before and during the MLE; however we also test whether public
firms anticipated privatisation by increasing their productivity (hypothesis 4) as has
been observed elsewhere (see for example Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones, 1996).
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As well as these four hypotheses we also examine two other aspects of the regulatory
régime: whether or not capital is treated as a fixed input, since in effect there was very
little capacity change during the period concerned; and how effective the
environmental regulation was in constraining the production of pollutants.  To assess
the effect of our model specification we also compare our reference model with
conventional formulations in electricity generation.
3. The measurement of efficiency performance and productivity change
One performance measure of any economic unit is partial productivity indices or
output/input ratios.  However most technologies employ several inputs and produce
different outputs so that improvement in a partial productivity index might be
explained by input-output substitution, and not necessarily by an efficiency
improvement in input usage or output production. Likewise, the measurement of
productive efficiency is often orientated in some way, in the sense that either inputs or
outputs are considered exogenous or outwith the control of the firm.  An input
oriented efficiency measure indicates the ability of one economic unit to reduce the
input consumption for a given level of output.  Conversely, output orientation
measures the ability of an economic unit to increase output for a fixed level of inputs.
Which is adopted depends on which best describes the managers’ behaviour. In some
circumstances simultaneous output maximisation and input minimisation constitute
the most realistic behavioural assumption.
Some production processes (for example, paper and electricity) produce both good (or
desirable) outputs and bad or undesirable outputs (pollutants).  In these cases
environmental gains or losses should be included in efficiency measurement.
Moreover the disposal of these bad outputs is generally costly because of
environmental regulation: limits on the emission of pollutants may constrain or reduce
production of desirable outputs.  Such regulation implies that bad outputs should be
considered as non-freely disposable.
We take into account both managerial objectives and environmental constraints in
analysing the productivity of electrical power generation.  We measure the ability of
one power plant to reduce inputs and undesirable outputs while simultaneously
increasing desirable outputs. Following Fare et al. (1985, 1989) we measure the
performance of power generating units through what they called the enhanced
hyperbolic productive efficiency measure.
Using standard notation, we assume that there are I producers who transform a set of
inputs  x Î + R
n into outputs  y Î + R
m . Let y = (yg ,yb) where  yg Î + R
l denotes the
subvector of l good outputs and  yb Î + R
q  the subvector of q bads. Let X (n x I) be the
matrix of observed inputs, and M = (M
g, M
b) the output matrix, where M
g (l x I) and
M
b (q x I) denote the submatrices of all desirable outputs and all undesirable outputs
respectively.  The technology of production can be represented by the Graph, which is
the set of all feasible input-output vectors. The piecewise linear representation of the
Graph is defined as7
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where z is a vector of intensity variables used as weights to construct the piecewise
linear frontier of the technology.  Inequalities indicate free (or strong) disposability of
desirable outputs and inputs, whereas equality indicates weak disposability of
undesirable outputs, m is a scaling factor required to satisfy weak disposability under
variable returns to scale.  G characterises the production technology relative to which
efficiency is calculated.  Thus, the hyperbolic productive efficiency measure is defined
as
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H  provides the equiproportionate expansion of good outputs and contraction of inputs
and bad outputs, and is computed as the solution to the mathematical programming
problem provided in Appendix 1.That is, (in)efficiency is measured by the distance of
each observation from the best-practice frontier constructed by enveloping the data
with piecewise linear facets. For comprehensive surveys on both methodological
aspects and applications of this approach, see Charnes et al (1994) Lovell (1994) and
Färe et al (1994a).
As we explain in the next section, we have a panel with I power plants and t = 1,...,T
years, so that we extend our analysis to assess productivity changes across time. We
use the Malmquist index approach (Malmquist, 1953) to calculate the total factor
productivity change. The utilisation of this approach offers significant advantages over
the usual measures of TFP
7 in the electricity industry. Firstly, it does not require the
definition of a specific form of an underlying production function that characterises
the existent technology. Secondly, no pre-specified optimising behaviour by the
economic unit, such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation, is assumed. Thirdly,
the computation of the Malmquist productivity index does not require price or cost
data. Such features are especially valuable in a regulated environment like the
electricity industry, characterised by informational asymmetries, price distortions and
economies of scale. Additionally, a very attractive characteristic of the Malmquist
index is that it is decomposable, permitting the identification of the major sources of
any productivity change.  Färe et al (1998) provide a recent survey on the main
theoretical and practical issues of the Malmquist Productivity Index.
Therefore, the previous hyperbolic productive efficiency measures are used to
compute the Graphyperbolic Malmquist Productivity Index proposed by Lovell and
Zofío, 1997.  Unlike other Malmquist index specifications the Graphyperbolic is
neither input- nor output-based (see Färe et al (1994b), Grifell and Lovell (1995,
1997), Bjurek (1996) and Ray and Desli (1997) for alternative definitions and
decompositions).  The Graphyperbolic Malmquist productivity index relative to period
t technology is defined as
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t+1 are input and output vectors at times t and t+1 respectively.
Hc
t(y,x)  is the hyperbolic distance function, where the subscript c indicates that the
distance function is computed with reference to the conical technology (i.e. the
constant returns to scale technology cone).   That is,  M
t  provides a measure of




t) using technology prevailing in
period t as a reference. An index greater than, equal to, or less than unity indicates that
productivity has increased, remained unchanged or declined respectively.
A period t based Graphyperbolic Malmquist productivity index can be multiplicatively


































































                                 
The first component measures the magnitude of the change in technical efficiency
between period t and t+1, i.e. it represents the catching-up effect of the relative
movement of each observation towards its own frontier. The component within the
second square brackets quantifies the magnitude of technical change or shifts in the
production frontier, measured by the change in the relative distance between the
frontiers in t and t+1.  The third term is a scale index which measures the contribution
of scale economies to productivity change. The numerator provides an index of the
scale efficiency of (x
t+1, y
t+1) and the denominator provides a scale index of (x
t, y
t),
both being relative to period t technology, i.e. it measures the distance of each
observation from the technically optimal scale prevailing in period t.  A value greater
(less) than one indicates that a change in the scale of production has lead the unit
closer to (away from) the technically optimal scale and in consequence, contributes
positively (negatively) to the productivity change.  In order to avoid the arbitrary
selection of either t or t+1  as the reference period, we adopt the usual practice of
taking the geometric mean of both t and t+1 based Malmquist indices (Färe et al,
1989, 1994a).
Finally we calculate a sequential frontier by constructing the reference production set
for year t with the observations at t and all observations up to that year (Tulkens and
Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). This approach implies that knowledge does not get lost and
past progress is accounted for in the determination of the contemporaneous frontier.
Technical regress is not possible with this specification, i.e. only outwards frontier
shifts are feasible.9
4. Data and results
Generation of electrical power requires three basic inputs: capital, labour and fuel.
Capital is measured in MW of capacity, labour as the average number of employees at
each plant, and fuel in millions of therms.  Output is the annual net power produced
by each generating unit, measured in megawatt hours (MWh).  Productivity in
electricity generation has been traditionally calculated using these variables (Seitz,
1971, Färe et al, 1985, Pollitt, 1995, Coelli et al 1998, among others), and assuming
that the plants' objective is to minimise inputs for a given level of output.  We report
the results of such a conventional analysis of our data in the next section.
However, this traditional approach to the measurement of productive efficiency
constitutes a limited framework to evaluate differences in the performance across time
and firms in the power generating sector.  We adopt a different benchmark model
from the traditional approach and include four additional outputs.  Firstly, we
introduce the declared availability as a second desirable output, measured by the
megawatt hours the plant declares available (ready to be called-up). The producers
could influence the hours for which plant was declared available, for which they
received some revenue to provide an incentive for optimising the management of
installed capacity
8. Secondly, we include three pollutants as undesirable outputs:
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and particulates, each measured in tons.
The emission of pollutants is constrained by environmental protection restrictions
imposed by Spanish law and European directives.  We assume that bad outputs are
subject to environmental regulation, that is that they are weakly disposable.  Installed
capacity does not vary for each plant from one year to another, and so we have treated
the capacity input as fixed in our initial analysis.  This set of assumptions constitutes
our reference model (1).
All variables are measured in physical units, as in the purest microeconomic definition
of technical efficiency. Since this is an intertemporal analysis, it presents the
additional advantage of avoiding different monetary valuations across time.  Our
purpose is not only the assessment of the relative performance in one period but the
productivity change over a period of years.  We analyse data from thirty-three
generating units, accounting for the entire coal-fired generation in Spain during the
period under consideration. Nineteen of them were privately owned and fourteen were
under public control. Table 2 gives some characteristics of each group. All data were
supplied by the National Electricity Regulatory Commission (CNSE) and Red
Eléctrica de España (REE), with the exception of the number of employees, which
was extracted from industry sources.
[Table 2 about here]
One important issue related to differences in the size of the plants is the potential
significance of scale economies. Most of the previous engineering and econometric
studies estimate that scale economies at the unit level exist up to about 300-400 MW
in the case of a base-load coal-powered generator unit (Joskow and Schmalensee,
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1983).  We consider as output not only the energy generated but also declared plant
availability. As Joskow and Schmalensee also remark, larger units face higher
operating and maintenance problems and tend to exhibit lower availability.  Given the
range of sizes included in this study (see Table 2) we construct a production frontier
allowing variable returns to scale.
In order to analyse the evolution of the relative performance between private and
public generators over time, we calculate the efficiency measures using the whole
sample as the reference production set
9 (i.e. 462 observations).  This gives us a picture
of the extent to which less productive units moved closer to the best practice frontier
defined by the most efficient generators throughout the whole observation period. If
we assume that knowledge accumulates over time, this frontier can be interpreted as
the technology feasible during the last year of each period.
Additionally, we construct the average plant for each sector and year and include these
artificial plants as additional observations (28 units). The purpose is to measure the
technical efficiency of both the private and the public sectors. As Førsund and
Hjalmarsson (1979) point out, this constitutes an alternative and more satisfactory
measure of structural efficiency than the conventional approach suggested by Farrell
(1957) of the weighted average (by output) of the efficiency scores of the individual
units.  There is also the complication when considering more than one output, as we
do, of weighting scores in a somewhat arbitrary manner, complicating the
interpretation in sectoral terms.
The Spanish electricity industry operated under the MLE as an integrated system with
respect to key decision-making, both long term and short term. For example, each unit
needs to be out of service occasionally to carry out major checking, repair and
maintenance works, affecting the level of availability and power generated.
Timetabling of these planned outages was  co-ordinated so that they were scheduled in
alternate years to avoid a large number of idle plants during any one period. This
central co-ordination should be taken into account in interpreting individual efficiency
scores for single years.
Table 3 and figure 1 show results for the average private and public generator in
model 1, and the (unweighted arithmetic) annual average of the individual scores.
Although the magnitudes do not generally coincide (the average of the individual
scores is consistently higher) the average firm appears to be representative for
generators within that sector, and the patterns are similar.  Individual efficiency scores
are used in the statistical tests of our hypotheses.  The efficiency scores for each plant
are given in appendix 3.
[Table 3 and Figure 1 about here]
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the intertemporal structural efficiency scores for the
average generator in both public and private sectors.  We should recall that we are
gauging the position of each of these representative firms relative to a stable reference
(intertemporal) frontier.
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[Figure  2 about here]
Public sector generators are on average more efficient before introduction of the price
cap, but the private sector 'catches up' and indeed overtakes the public sector under
incentive regulation.  Public sector efficiency increases slightly towards the end of the
period, immediately before privatisation.  We see from table 3 that the average private
firm had an efficiency score of 0.953 in 1997, indicating that it could have
simultaneously increased good outputs and reduced bad outputs and variable inputs at
a rate of 4.7%.  The score of 0.849 in 1984 implies a potential productivity
improvement of 15.1%.  Public generators achieved a score of 0.921 in 1984 and
0.946 in 1997.  The gap between the public and the private sector was reduced from
7.2% in 1984 to only 0.7% in 1997, and reversed in many of the years during the
period of the price cap.
In order to identify the annual TFP change, we compute the Graphyperbolic
Malmquist productivity index and its component parts as explained in the previous
section. The technology for computing the distance functions is constructed as a
sequential frontier, described above. The results are shown cumulatively for each
sector from a base of 1 in 1984 in Table 4 and Figure 3.
[Table 4 and Figure 3 about here]
The cumulative index (figure 3a) illustrates the faster increase in productivity amongst
private companies in the early years of the price cap, and a fairly similar pattern in the
two groups thereafter.  However the composition of the increased productivity was
somewhat different between the two sectors.  Most of the difference in the growth of
productivity is accounted for by a large increase in the efficiency index in the private
sector around the time that the price cap was introduced, with no improvement (and
some falling back) in this measure during the price cap (figure 3b).  This shows that
the average efficiency of the private sector increased through improvement by the
least efficient plants, relative to the boundary defined by the most efficient.  Improved
performance of the most efficient firms, shown by the technological change index,
was comparatively modest, though somewhat higher in the private than the public
sector, especially during the early years of the period (figure 3c).  The scale index was
rather erratic, with very little difference between the sectors (figure 3d).
To explore the catching up process further we analysed the performance of individual
companies within the private sector; table 5 and figure 4 show how much the average
efficiency of the companies has converged to the most efficient level since 1984.
There were a number of mergers and take-overs during this period, but these do not
seem to have played a major part.  It seems that private sector efficiency did increase
around the time of introducing incentive regulation, by raising the performance of the
more inefficient plants and firms; we would expect the introduction of standardised
remuneration to have a particularly strong impact on inefficient firms, because of the
potential losses which they would otherwise have sustained.
[Table 5 and Figure 4 about here]12
To test our hypotheses on the effects of different types of regulation, including
anticipation of privatisation, we used a series of non-parametric tests on our reference
model.  We divided the sample into three periods: period 1, before the introduction of
price cap (1984-1987); period 2, during the price cap until (possible) anticipation of
privatisation (1988 to 1994 inclusive); and period 3, the three years immediately
before privatisation, 1995-97.  To test the hypothesis that public firms are more
efficient under cost of service regulation, we used a Mann-Whitney test and a test for
the difference in the median of populations for the two sectors in period 1.  Both tests
rejected the null hypothesis that the populations were the same at a 1% significance
level.  We used these two tests and a Wilcoxon test to test for changes in behaviour
between period 1 and period 2 (pre and post price cap) in both the private and the
public sectors.  All three tests rejected the null hypothesis of no change in the private
sector at 1% significance, but provided insufficient evidence for rejecting the null
hypothesis in the public sector.  We therefore conclude that the price cap increased
efficiency in the private sector, but not significantly so in the public sector.  Using
similar tests we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal efficiency in each
sector during the price cap (period 2), and that efficiency improved in the public sector
immediately prior to privatisation.  The statistical tests are reported in appendix 2.
5. Variations of the model and comparison with conventional analysis
We consider two variants of our reference model, described in the previous section.
In the first (model 2) we allow capital to vary so that we can assess long run
productive efficiency compared with short run efficiency in our reference model. The
efficiency scores of the average firms in each sector in Model 2 are shown in figure 5.
While this shows a similar pattern to figure 3, the efficiency of the two sectors is
much closer during the price cap régime if capital input is allowed to vary.
Productivity in the public sector is relatively lower when capital is treated as a fixed
input than when capital is allowed to vary; this can be interpreted as the public sector
choosing a more efficient level of capital (long run), but the private sector using
capital more efficiently in the short-run.
[Figure 5 about here]
The effectiveness of environmental regulation was addressed by comparing our basic
model (with weak disposability of the three pollutants) with a model which differed
only in making these bad outputs strongly disposable (model 3).  The difference
between the two sets of results gives an indication of whether the regulation was
binding, and if so its effects on efficiency in terms of lost output (figure 6).  Where the
graph is zero, regulation is not binding and has had no effect on efficiency as
measured by other inputs and outputs.  We see that regulation has on average reduced
efficiency by 1.4% in the private sector, and about 1% in the public sector; this
potential increase of good outputs and reduction in inputs measures the 'cost' of
imposing environmental regulation.  The public sector produces higher levels of
pollutants per unit of electricity generated, so it appears that the constraints were laxer
for public sector producers, no doubt partly reflecting the government's commitment
to continuing production from indigenous lignite (dirty) coal fields.  In general,
environmental regulation has been binding, and this justifies our choice of weak
disposability of bad outputs in our reference model.13
[Figure 6 about here]
Finally we compare our preferred model with the conventional model (model 4, figure
7).   In this model public and private plants appear equally efficient under price cap
regulation, in contrast to the slightly (but insignficantly) higher private efficiency
shown in model 1.   Higher relative efficiency in the private sector in the reference
model is partly the effect of short-run efficiency (see comparison of models 1 and 3)
and partly because the public plants emitted more sulphur dioxide and particulates per
unit of power generated (though slightly less nitrous oxide).  The conventional model
is unable to identify these effects, both of which are included in model 1.
[Table 5 and Figure 7 about here]
6. Conclusions
Public coal powered generation plants were more efficient than those in the private
sector under cost of service regulation.  Public sector managers did indeed seem to
take the social cost of subsidies into account, more than at least some of their private
sector counterparts.  In particular the wide divergence of performance between
different private companies suggests that some companies and plant managers were
little motivated by concerns of efficiency; however it should be noted that some of the
private plants were amongst the most efficient throughout the period, including these
early years (the most efficient plants in each year included representatives from both
private and public firms, see appendix 3).
Price cap regulation produced a dramatic change, raising the performance of the least
efficient private sector plants and so significantly improving average private sector
performance.  The fact that not only the less efficient plants but also the less efficient
companies dramatically improved performance, suggests that this was indeed a result
of the incentive effect of the price cap on the less efficient private firms, who
succeeded in transmitting these incentives to plant managers.  The timing of the
private sector improvements is particularly striking and seems to be directly related to
the introduction of the price cap (figures 3b and 4), rather than any of the mergers
which occurred somewhat later in the period.   The price cap seems to have been a
highly effective incentive mechanism for the private sector in its short run operating
decisions, and to have achieved its objective of stimulating efficiency.
Less efficient public sector plants also showed some catching up with their most
efficient exemplars over the period, but the effect was much less dramatic, and overall
efficiency in the public sector did not show a statistically significant improvement
after the price cap was introduced.  Similarly, although there is some evidence that the
less efficient public sector plants were moving (erratically) closer to the efficient
frontier in anticipation of privatisation after 1994, there was not a statistically
significant growth in overall efficiency.
Environmental regulation during the period was binding, and had a 'cost' of about 1%
of output in the public sector and 1.4% in the private sector.  When we compared long
run (variable capital input) with our reference model short-run specification we found14
that the public plants became more efficient relative to private plants throughout most
of the period (model 2, figure 5).   Thus while private plants were on average more
efficient than the private sector with fixed capital (short-run), the public plants may
have (chosen) a more appropriate level of capital and be relatively more efficient in
the long-run.  Since all the plants in our sample were commissioned before 1988 this
does not directly support Laffont and Crampes' concerns about the undesirable
incentive effects of the MLE on investment, but does suggest some more general
concerns about investment choices
10.  In particular there may be some important
policy implications for future investment decisions, and for how any stranded capital
is treated in the new (post 1998) competitive market.
We raise some methodological issues about the most appropriate measures of input
and output in a centrally despatched system where generators’ order of despatch is
determined exogenously, and suggest an alternative to the standard use of power
generation as a single output, including the declared plant availability, since this
partially determined the Spanish firms’ revenues.  Three pollutants are also included
to reflect recent changes in environmental requirements, and we looked both at fixed
and variable capital input to distinguish short term and long term efficiency.
Our results challenge some of the conventional wisdom on productive efficiency in
the public and private sectors under both cost of service and incentive regulation.  The
private sector improvement during price cap regulation, 1.9 % a year, compares with
an annual increase of 5.6% for all electricity plants in the UK in 1990-95, where
incentive regulation and competition were accompanied by privatisation (Utilities
Journal, 1998).  However the Spanish private sector increases were significantly
higher than the 0.47 % annual increase in Australian coal-fired generation during the
period 1981-1991 (Coelli et al 1998).
The Spanish experience enables us to distinguish the effects of regulatory régimes on
each sector. We can compare productivity changes within both public and private
companies while they were undergoing the same regulatory reform but not subject to
any changes of ownership or market structure. Our results support our hypotheses that
public firms are more efficient under cost of service regulation and that incentive
regulation will increase efficiency in the private sector.  These results have important
implications for policy design in this and similar sectors in many countries where
ownership, market structure and regulatory design are currently being fundamentally
reformed.  In particular, regulatory mechanisms should be designed to fit the
ownership structure to which they are applied: while incentive regulation may increase
the productivity of privately owned firms, cost of service regulation may be more
appropriate for plants within the public sector.
                                                          
10 Our analysis does not include the distribution part of the industry, which was also part of Laffont and
Crampes' concern.15
Appendix 1
We assume that there are i = 1,...,It  observations and t = 1,..., T periods of time. Each
firm uses  ( ) xx x v
it it
V
it = 1 ,...,  variable inputs and  ( ) xx x f
it it
F
it = 1 ,...,  fixed inputs to
produce  ( ) yy y g
it it
L
it = 1 ,...,  good outputs and  ( ) yy y b
it it
Q
it = 1 ,..., . The efficiency measures
necessary to calculate the Graphyperbolic Malmquist productivity index can be
obtained by solving the following programming problems (notice that the technology
is sequentially defined from s =1 up until s= t):
( ) Hx , y m i n
l= 1,...,L
yq = 1 , . . . , Q
v=1,...,V
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Strong disposability of bad ouputs is computed by replacing the equality in the second
restriction by inequality.16
Appendix 2
Summary of statistical tests for the alternative hypotheses





































Hypothesis 1:  public versus private efficiency in period 1 (1984-1987)
Hypothesis 2a: private efficiency in period 2 greater than that in period 1
Hypothesis 2b: public efficiency in period 2 greater than that in period 1
Hypothesis 3: public versus private efficiency in period 2.
Hypothesis 4: public efficiency in period 2 and 3 (to test anticipation of privatisation)
A value of less than 0.05 in the bracket below each test statistic indicates rejection at the 5% level of the
null hypothesis of no difference in efficiency.17
Appendix 3: Efficiency Scores for each plant: Model 1
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
PUBLIC
unit 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9871 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 2 * ** 1.0000 0.9948 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 3 0.8899 0.9907 0.9535 0.9381 0.9766 0.9729 0.9692 0.9718 0.9556 0.9585 0.9801 0.9906 0.9755 0.9920
unit 4 1.0000 0.9550 0.9478 0.9205 0.9775 0.9761 0.9781 0.9833 0.9705 0.9836 0.9770 0.9939 1.0000 1.0000
unit 5 * 0.9727 0.9462 0.9477 0.9816 0.9861 0.9856 1.0000 0.9766 1.0000 0.9847 0.9864 0.9993 1.0000
unit 6 * 0.9814 0.9919 0.9926 0.9820 1.0000 0.9883 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 7 0.8577 0.8548 0.9852 0.8663 0.9971 0.9724 0.9809 0.9656 0.9845 0.9559 0.9819 0.9942 1.0000 1.0000
unit 8 0.9213 0.8956 1.0000 0.9623 0.9611 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9393 0.9808 1.0000 0.8735 0.9659 0.9671
unit 9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9609 0.9687 0.9858 1.0000 0.9768 0.9516 0.9525 1.0000 0.9140 0.8811 0.9606
unit 10 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9788 0.9803 1.0000 1.0000 0.9671 0.9606 1.0000 0.9979 0.9682 0.9945
unit 11 0.9954 1.0000 0.9947 0.9786 0.9663 0.9834 1.0000 0.9814 0.9311 0.9472 1.0000 0.9777 0.9975 0.8822
unit 12 0.9885 1.0000 1.0000 0.9926 1.0000 0.9606 1.0000 0.9718 1.0000 0.9900 0.9338 0.9927 1.0000 1.0000
unit 13 1.0000 1.0000 0.9816 0.9989 0.9561 0.9935 1.0000 0.9722 1.0000 0.9305 1.0000 0.9962 0.9983 0.9359
unit 14 0.9957 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9608 1.0000 0.9954 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9942 0.9503 1.0000 0.9959
PRIVATE
unit 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9810 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9951 0.9891 0.9847 0.9524
unit 2 * 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9962 1.0000 0.9928 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 3 0.9219 0.9219 0.9205 0.9676 1.0000 0.9899 1.0000 0.9985 0.9981 0.9891 0.9836 1.0000 0.9955 1.0000
unit 4 * 0.9649 0.9798 0.9771 0.9734 1.0000 1.0000 0.9856 1.0000 0.9906 1.0000 0.9933 0.9981 1.0000
unit 5 1.0000 1.0000 0.9908 1.0000 1.0000 0.9639 1.0000 0.9836 1.0000 0.9927 0.9887 0.9518 1.0000 1.0000
unit 6 1.0000 0.9675 0.9806 1.0000 1.0000 0.9748 0.9747 0.9764 0.9521 0.9679 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 7 * 0.8933 0.9024 0.9110 0.9554 0.9657 0.9613 0.9760 0.9770 0.9697 0.9766 0.9806 0.9883 0.9794
unit 8 1.0000 1.0000 0.9813 0.9036 1.0000 1.0000 0.9519 0.9614 0.9868 1.0000 1.0000 0.9823 1.0000 0.9570
unit 9 1.0000 0.8217 0.8933 0.8691 0.9570 0.9567 0.9662 0.9366 0.9454 0.9367 0.9583 0.9645 0.9731 0.9501
unit 10 0.9461 1.0000 0.9652 0.9832 1.0000 1.0000 0.9992 0.9657 1.0000 1.0000 0.9426 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 11 0.8516 0.9668 0.9774 0.9771 0.9996 0.9904 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9937 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
unit 12 * 0.9176 0.9772 0.9474 0.9715 0.9595 0.9945 0.9862 0.9844 0.9976 0.9958 0.9982 1.0000 0.9920
unit 13 1.0000 0.9922 0.9610 0.9581 1.0000 0.9767 0.9444 0.9720 0.9854 0.9702 0.9697 0.9770 1.0000 1.0000
unit 14 0.8338 0.8271 0.7847 0.8238 0.9351 0.9999 0.9203 0.9559 0.9313 0.9420 0.9615 0.9520 0.9639 0.9890
unit 15 0.9150 0.8927 0.8979 0.9099 1.0000 0.9804 0.9113 0.9620 0.9633 0.9550 0.9622 0.9966 1.0000 0.9939
unit 16 * 0.8927 0.8964 0.9226 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9886 0.9997 0.9816 0.9872 0.9966 1.0000 1.0000
unit 17 1.0000 1.0000 0.9963 0.9450 0.8953 0.9062 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9462 0.9793 1.0000
unit 18 0.8878 0.8690 0.8885 0.9795 0.9858 0.9453 0.9867 0.9535 1.0000 0.9631 0.9885 0.9986 0.9958 0.9558
unit 19 * 0.9735 0.8617 0.9071 0.9878 0.9620 0.9934 0.9701 0.9757 0.9897 0.9706 0.9925 1.0000 1.0000
* These plants were commisioned in 1985
** The plant did not operate that year.18
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Table 1.  Capacity and generation by fuel type and average production shares
during 1984-1997 (autoproducers not included)
Capacity (MW) Production  (GWH)
1997 1984-1997 1997 1984-1997
Hydro 16,532 37% 33,168 20%
Coal 11,224 26% 62,098 42%
Nuclear 7,581 16% 55,297 35%
Oil + Gas 8,214 21% 6,844 3%
Total 43,551 157,407
Source: Adapted from CSEN (1997) and REE (1997)
Table 2. Plant characteristics by type of ownership (mean values 1984-1997)
Private Public
Average capacity (MW) 307 330
Range (MW) 148-550 141-550






Grams of Particulates / MWh 583 638
Grams of SO2 emissions / MWh 12,788 32,012
Grams of NOx emissions/ MWh 3,928 3,28321
Table 3:  Intertemporal structural efficiency: model 1
Average firm Average of individual scores
Public Private Public Private
1984 0.921 0.849 0.968 0.950
1985 0.926 0.882 0.973 0.942
1986 0.907 0.897 0.986 0.940
1987 0.899 0.898 0.968 0.946
1988 0.906 0.944 0.979 0.981
1989 0.926 0.940 0.986 0.977
1990 0.926 0.946 0.993 0.979
1991 0.925 0.949 0.987 0.977
1992 0.930 0.950 0.977 0.984
1993 0.925 0.952 0.976 0.981
1994 0.924 0.951 0.989 0.983
1995 0.943 0.955 0.976 0.985
1996 0.946 0.959 0.985 0.994
1997 0.946 0.953 0.981 0.988
Mean 0.925 0.930 0.980 0.97222










1984 1 1 1 1
1985 1.105 0.963 1.156 0.992
1986 1.138 0.977 1.162 1.002
1987 1.170 1.020 1.170 0.980
1988 1.346 1.056 1.232 1.035
1989 1.346 1.057 1.251 1.018
1990 1.372 1.060 1.270 1.020
1991 1.382 1.053 1.282 1.023
1992 1.384 1.048 1.300 1.016
1993 1.396 1.048 1.304 1.021
1994 1.392 1.046 1.304 1.021
1995 1.398 1.049 1.304 1.022
1996 1.387 1.051 1.305 1.011









1984 1 1 1 1
1985 1.011 0.949 1.055 1.009
1986 0.949 0.929 1.069 0.956
1987 0.937 0.911 1.105 0.930
1988 1.043 0.927 1.120 1.005
1989 1.105 0.958 1.126 1.024
1990 1.121 0.940 1.133 1.053
1991 1.099 0.946 1.136 1.023
1992 1.117 0.940 1.150 1.034
1993 1.128 0.954 1.151 1.027
1994 1.127 0.951 1.151 1.030
1995 1.163 0.991 1.155 1.015
1996 1.145 0.957 1.155 1.034
1997 1.159 0.987 1.160 1.01323



















1984 0.9680 0.9722 0.9087 1.0000 1.0000 0.8338 0.8878
1985 0.9731 0.9349 0.9320 1.0000 1.0000 0.8960 0.9213
1986 0.9858 0.9343 0.9391 1.0000 0.9936 0.8823 0.8751
1987 0.9681 0.9284 0.9513 1.0000 0.9725 0.9005 0.9433
1988 0.9790 0.9825 0.9952 0.9905 0.9477 0.9543 0.9868
1989 0.9856 0.9748 0.9867 1.0000 0.9351 1.0000 0.9537
1990 0.9927 0.9597 0.9842 1.0000 1.0000 0.9602 0.9901
1991 0.9874 0.9645 0.9835 1.0000 0.9918 0.9708 0.9618
1992 0.9769 0.9653 0.9909 0.9981 1.0000 0.9657 0.9879
1993 0.9772 0.9689 0.9862 1.0000 0.9964 0.9663 0.9764
1994 0.9894 0.9809 0.9786 0.9940 0.9944 0.9808 0.9796
1995 0.9762 0.9809 0.9986 0.9946 0.9490 0.9727 0.9956
1996 0.9847 0.9923 0.9993 0.9924 0.9897 0.9810 1.0000
1997 0.9806 0.9773 0.9977 0.9762 1.0000 0.9945 0.9779


















Figure 1: Intertemporal structural efficiency:  comparison of the scores of the
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of environmental constraints and effect on output
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